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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

14161

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N,A. ,
a National Banking Association,
MICHAEL PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES-,'
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellees, as the grandchildren, daughter-in-law, and the
trustee of Dr. Clarence T. Jones, deceased, seek to sustain the lower
court's decision holding that a revocable inter vivos trust created
by Dr. Jones after the death of his first wife, and several months
before his marriage to Thressa G, Jones, did not retain in the settlor
those incidents of ownership constituting a legal or equitable estate
in real property which would entitle his surviving widow to a one-third
interest in real property pursuant to 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding, found that
the Appellant had no statutory interest in the real property conveyed
in trust to the defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., prior
to his marriage.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellees seek to sustain the judgment of the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trust, which is the subject of this litigation, was
established by Dr. C. T. Jones, a veterinarian who practiced his
profession in American Fork, Utah, for some 50 years. Dr. Jones was
married to Cleo Jones in 1918 and had two children born as issue of
this marriage, a son Stanley, and a daughter, Irene.
The son, Stanley, had two daughters, Kayleen and Janice, who
are defendants.

Stanley had a chronic drinking problem and worked for

his father under close supervision until his death at age 47 in 1969.
The daughter, Irene, had three children: Michael Peters,
Peggy P. Cunningham, and Craig Peters, two of whom are defendants.

This

daughter died in 1953 at the age of 33. The deceased grandchild, Craig
Peters, was afflicted with muscular dystrophy which confined him to
a wheelchair early in his life. Dr. Jones paid for a specially
equipped vehicle for his crippled grandson, Craig, and financed his
university education, he having obtained a degree from Brigham Young
University in 1963, and having died a year later.
As testimony revealed, all of the defendant grandchildren
received considerable financial assistance from their grandfather,
and since both of the parents were deceased, they were treated more as
the children of Dr. Jones than as his grandchildren.
After 42 years of marriage, Dr. Jones1 first wife died and
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he hired Thressa, the original plaintiff, as housekeeper at $100.00
per month plus board.

It was while Thressa was living in the home,

caring for certain of the defendants1 and the doctor's needs, that
he proceeded to take steps to provide for his grandchildren through
the establishment of a trust. In the spring and summer of 1961 the
Doctor visited the Trust Department of First Security Bank along with
Thressa, and on at least one occasion, the bank's trust officer,
Thomas Cuthbert, visited the Doctor's home in American Fork.
Finally, on June 23, 1961, a trust agreement was executed,
and on July 14, 1961, a Warranty Deed conveying all of his real
property, was executed and delivered to the bank.

Some 140 days after

making the trust, and 118 days after delivery of the deed, Dr. Jones
married Thressa.
At the time of the marriage Dr. Jones was 67 years of age
and Thressa 59. Thressa died on the 25th day of November, 1974, after
litigation had commenced, and her daughter, Etta Jean Horn, was
substituted as party plaintiff.
Thressa G. Jones testified in her deposition that the Doctor's
business was his own affair, and that it made no difference what he had
done with his property.

She would have married him in any event.

(Mrs. Jones' deposition, p 46, line 16).

She had accompanied him to

Salt Lake City and ifaited at the Trust Department of First Security
Bank, signed joint tax returns for the years 1962 to 1972, all of which
made reference to trust expense and income, and all of which contain
the provision "under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined
this return,,..and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true,
correct and complete."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

The trust was amended on five separate occasions, and in
all agreements the defendant grandchildren's needs were foremost in
the Doctor's mind.

In the Third Amended Trust dated June 10, 1970,

Thressa was included for the first time and was left $20,000.00 cash,
$150.00 per month payment, and possession of the residence in American
Fork.

His widow lived in the home, was paid the monthly allowance,

and exercised her power of appointment as set forth in the Trust,
naming the present plaintiff by the exercise of said power.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO TRUST BY DR. CLARENCE
T. JONES WAS NOT ILLUSORY AND, BY VIRTUE OF SUCH
TRANSFER, THE WIDOW OF DR. CLARENCE T. JONES WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO A STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID REAL PROPERTY
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 74-4-3, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
The Jones Trust is a valid inter vivos conveyance even
though the Trustor held a life estate and retained the power to
revoke said Trust.

Such Trust is not testamentary, not illusory;

beneficiaries interests are vested, not contingent;

the

therefore, the

statutory dower interest does not attach.
The leading Utah case dealing with the rights of a widow in
an inter vivos trust is Alexander vs. Zions Savings Bank and Trust Co.
2 Utah 2d 317, 273 Pac. 2d 173, and Opinion on Rehearing, 4 Utah 2d 90,
287 Pac. 2d 665. The Appellant has cited this case as favoring her
position but, in fact, it does not as subsequent legislation and
distinguishable facts make this case compelling precedent for the
Appellees position.

4.
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The facts in this case are similar to the case at hand in
that a second wife claimed a one-third statutory interest in real
property.

However, the facts vary in two crucial respects. First,

the trust explicitly directs that no interest is to vest in the
beneficiary until settlor1s death and, secondly, that property was,
after his first wife's death

and his subsequent marriage, taken from

the trust corpus and conveyed to a third party, which party in
exchange, conveyed to the trustee the real property involved in the
instant action.
The Court held against the trustee declaring the provisions
against vesting made the trust testamentary in character and n.ot conforming to the requirements of the statute pertaining to wills.
In so holding, the Court said that the power of revocation
will not invalidate a trust, and stated in the opinion on rehearing:
11

(W)e...address ourselves only to matters contained in the
dissenting opinion about which we are constrained to
comment. The dissenting opinion concernes itself mostly
with the conceded proposition that a power of
revocation or control will not invalidate a trust. Our
former opinion had no quarrel with such basic principle,
and neither does this." (Emphasis added.)
It would appear to defendants that the validity of the trust
itself is clearly established, and the next point to be considered is
whether the interest retained by Dr. Jones created an "equitable11
interest to which the statutory widow's rights would attach.

It is

their position that it would not.
The principle of dower, as expressed in 74-4-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, is maintained though the form of administration has
been changed.

See in re Madsens Estate 123 Utah 327, 259 Pac. 2d 595.

5.
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The widow's share is said, in this case, to be an ''inchoate right of
dower.n

Therefore, the Utah widow's statutory interest in real

property may be analyzed based on the principles of dower.
Dower does not attach to interests in land which are not
descendable.

See Hilton vs. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 Pac. 20.

Also see Sullivan vs. Sullivan, 117 N.W. 1086 (Iowa case 1908), which
states:
H

The right of dower is not a vested right, but a mere
intangible, inchoate, contingent expectancy. Where
there is a defeasable title in the husband, and that
title is defeated, the right of dower in the wife
terminates."
Therefore, it is clearly established that there can be no
dower in a life estate.

See Restatement of the Law of Property, §128.

Until the power vested in Dr. Jones was exercised, he held
no more than a life estate with a possibility of reverter.

There can

be no widow's interest in such an estate if the husband dies before
performance of the condition precedent.
of Property, §154.

See Restatement of the Law

_

In the Sullivan case, id, the Court said:
n

\.

Dower is favored by the courts, but it is not to be
allowed at the expense of clearly inequitable results,
unless the statute requires it. The claim of dower
can be no higher quality than the seisin of the
husband at the instant when the concurrence of such
seisin and wife's coverture gave it birth."
Utah's statute was adopted from the Iowa statute and, there-

fore, is, in the respondent's judgment, persuassive precedent.
See 28 C.J.S. 83, §17, which states:

6.
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fl

It is only as to estates of inheritance, legal or
equitable, that dower exists."
Also §2, which states:
"There.is no dower in an estate less than one
inheritance since the dower of the widow is a
continuance of the estate of her husband. If
estate were less than one of inheritance, her
could not extend beyond his own life."

of
mere
his
right

In the case of Bodkin vs. Wright, 100 S.W. 2d 824, the court
stated:
"The reason is there is no inheritable quality attached
to a life estate, but immediately on the death of the
life tenant, the title passes to another and dower,
being a mere continuance of the estate of the husband,
the widow's right to dower cannot extend beyond his life."
The Appellant has cited Newman vs. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371,
9 N.E. 2d 122. This is a New York case and is distinguishable in that
the laws of that state allow a valid conveyance to defeat the dower
rights of a surviving spouse. The transfer was made only days before
the husband's death.

In this case the court was faced with the

problem of protecting the wife's rights when a conveyance had been made
within a few days of the husband's demise.

The Utah statute protects

a wife's claim to real property held during a marriage, and need not
resort to the concept of an illusory or colorable trust to protect a
wife's rights.
In Leach vs. Anderson,

Utah 2d, 535 Pac. 2d 1241, it was

held that a spendthrift trust created by and for the trustor, was
invalid against existing or subsequent creditors under 25-1-11, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. For this section to apply in the instant case,
the Appellant must show that she has a legitimate claim to the assets
of this trust or the statute has no bearing.

7.
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The case of Ackers vs. First National Bank of Topeka,192 Kan. 319,
387 Pac. 2d 840, is distinguishable because as under the New York
Statute, the spouse's claim to real property can be defeated by a
valid conveyance and, in this case, a married man was attempting to
defeat such interest.
Free vs. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 P. 407, is again distinguishable in that this case holds that a wife cannot be compelled by specific
performance to convey her one-third statutory share to real property
when she was not a party to the original agreement.
In reviewing the authorities cited by the Appellant, I find
no case in support of the proposition propounded by him that a valid
conveyance in the State of Utah of real property prior to marriage
does not deprive a subsequent spouse of her statutory interest.
The most recent and detailed annotation dealing with this
subject is to be found in 39 A.L.R. 3d 14. This annotation is entitled
"Inter Vivos Trust in Imparing Spouse's Right."

Several cases, including

Rose vs. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W. 2d 458, held that a trust created
one week before the settlor's marriage in which he retained complete
control over the real estate transferred, deprived his widow of any
claim to a statutory interest.

The court rejected arguments that such

holding would, (1) Allow evasion of taxes, or (2) Result in the
defrauding of creditors. The court said, as to the first, "That the
government had ample power to protect its taxing authorities" and,
with respect to the second, "That if a trust such as the present one
were resorted to for fraudulent purposes, it could be held void under
fraudulent conveyance statutes."

8.

•:
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Also see Richard vs. James (1956), 133 Colo. 180, 292 P. 2d
977. The court, in response to the argument that the conveyance
shortly before death was an illusory and not in good faith, states:
"There is no doubt of the power of a husband to convey
his property during his lifetime to whomsoever he saw
fit even though such conveyance had the effect of
depriving t:he wife of all right to inherit any part
thereof, provided the transaction was a bona fide and
not merely colorable, and that this was true even
though the express purpose of the conveyance was
to deprive the wife of her right of inheritance.ff
Any claim that the trust was a testamentary disposition of
property without proper formalities of a will has been remedied to
conform to the Restatement .of Trusts, Section 57, by the enactment of
74-3-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Supplement).
Thus, the conveyance of real property by Dr. Jones prior to
his marriage by the execution and delivery of a valid deed to the
defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, excludes the claim of his
widow from any statutory interest.
POINT II
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A FRAUD
ON THE SURVIVING SP0USEfS MARITAL RIGHTS.
Dr. Jones had engaged Thressa as a housekeeper some time in
June of 1960, (Mrs. Jones1 deposition p 18), at the rate of $100.00 per
month.

This relationship continued until the time of marriage which

was the 11th day of November, 1961. Even following the marriage, the
Doctor continued to give Mrs. Jones the same monthly allowance.
It came as no surprise that Dr. Jones conveyed his real
property to a trust on the 14th day of July, 1961, pursuant to the Trust
Agreement dated the 23rd day of June of that year, and the evidence
shows Mrs. George, later Mrs. Jones, had accompanied Dr. Jones to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

First Security Bank, Trust Department, had met Mr. Cuthbert both at
the bank and at her home in American Fork, all prior to the marriage.
Further, the Trust Agreement was revealed to Mrs. Jones by her own
admission in 1970, some three years before the Doctor's death.
(Deposition p 34).

Mrs. Jones admits that the placing of the property

in trust had no bearing upon the marriage, and she would have married
the Doctor regardless of such transfer being known and, also, provisions
were made in the trust to provide for the needs of the widow.

The

question was asked of Mrs. Jones, "Now if you had known that the
Doctor had transferred his real property into a trust when he married
you, would that have made a difference in your marrying him?11
Mrs. Jones answered, f?No.,f

(Deposition p 26).

In Re Madsen's Estate, 259 P. 2d 595, at 602, this court has
addressed itself to the purpose of Section 74-4-3, U.C.A. 1953, and
stated as follows:
concern.

"The wife's sustenance is a matter of great

The purpose of the law is to assure proper support of the

widow after the death of her husband."

Inspection of the trust created

by Dr. Jones discloses that he provided a trust corpus of $20,000.00
with a general power of appointment in favor of his wife.

There were

also arrangements made for Mrs. Jones to have continued use of the
house and furniture and monthly income. A case very similar to this
one, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that it was not fraud of the
marital rights of a second wife when the husband conveyed his real
property to the family by his first marriage prior to his second
marriage, and left his second wife $8,797.63.

10.
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In Re Kusar1 s Estate, 5 Ohio Misc. 23, 211 N.E. 2d 535
at 543 (1965), the court stipulated:

"It is cot as if Ignac Kusar

left his second wife penniless and without adequate funds to care
for her in lieu of a widow's allowance and years support. He left
her well provided for." It would seem that adequate provisions were
made for Mrs. Jones1 sustenance.
In Dilworth vs. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P. 2d 136,
at 138 (1967), the Utah Court has stated:

"...one of the essential

elements of fraud and deceit is that the plaintiff sustain damages•"
The Appellees claim that plaintiff has suffered no damages because
the deceased provided her with $20,000.00 in trust for her benefit.
The matter of fraud on the marital right of a surviving
spouse has been addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in two cases
similar to the present case.

In Re Kusar1s Estate, supra, and

Perlberg vs. Perlberg, 18 Ohio St. 2d 55, 247 N.E. 2d 306 (1969).
Both cases deal with a deceased husband that had conveyed property
for the benefit of his family by his first marriage just prior to
remarrying.

Neither husband disclosed the transfer prior to his

second marriage to the intended spouse. Both surivivng spouses, without success, attempted to have the transfers set aside. In the Kusar
case the deceased left $8,797.63 to his widow, and in the Perlberg
case the husband left $5,000.00 for his widow.

The deeds transferring

the property to the children in the Kusar case maintained a right of
reversion contingent on the second wife predeceasing Mr. Kusar which
is similar to a revocable trust. The three basic parts of fraud on the
marital rights are:(1) conveyance of property in contemplation of
marriage;

(2) nondisclosure to the intended spouse; and (3) intent

to defraud the marital rights of intended spouse. In the case In Re
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Kusar1s Estate, supra, at page 543, the court stated:
lf

And so it does seem just and proper to the court that
the second Mrs. Kusar cannot now claim any interest in
the Goller Avenue property which was transferred out of
her husband's name before this marriage was consummated.
But the second Mrs. Kusar called to our attention Ward v.
Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, a 1900 case which
held fA conveyance by a man who has entered into a
contract of narriage, which subsequently takes place,
of a portion of his land to his sons by a former marriage,
without consideration other than love and affection,
and without the knowledge or consent of his contemplated
wife, is a fraud on her marital rights, and she, at his
death, is entitled to dower therein.1
We believe that this case is distinguished from the
instant matter since in that case the deeds were not
recorded until after the death of the grantor, the wife
had no knowledge of the deeds until after the husband1s
death, and the decision was made prior to the 1932
revision of the Ohio Probate Code.
More to the point, we believe, is the 1943 decision in
Dick, Admx. vs. Bauman, 73 Ohio App. 107, 55 N.E. 2d 137,
where the court held:
f

The probate Code Act of 1932 placed no new restraints
upon the rights of one in life to dispose of his
property, and preserved to the surviving spouse only
a vested dower estate in any lands conveyed during
the marriage in which such survivor had not relinquished or been barred of dower.1
f

A widow is not entitled to have set aside as a fraud upon
her rights a conveyance of real estate made by her
husband to his children without consideration even
though he left no property from which she could receive
the exemptions provided for in Section 10509-54 General
Code (R.C. 2115.13), or the year's support mentioned
in Section 10509-74 General Code (R.C. 2117.20).! f!
In Perlberg vs. Perlberg, supra, 308, the Ohio court stated:
"...the case of Ward vs. Ward, 63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, 51 L.R.A.
858 is overruled."

.12.;
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In the instant case Mrs. Jones accompanied the deceased to
the Trust Office of First Security Bank on several occasions prior to
their marriage, the trust officer visited the Jones home, and in 1970,
Mrs. Jones was told of the trust and the disposition of the deceased's
real property.

There can be no claim that she did not know of the

trust prior to the death of Dr. Jones. She was aware of the dependence
of the deceased's son and grandchildren upon Dr. Jones, especially
Craig Peters, who was an invalid grandson with little or no hope of
recovery and who, in fact, did predecease Dr. Jones.

She knew that

Dr. Jones wanted to provide for his family's future.

In the Kusar

case, at page 542, the court said:
"We would like to think that the second Kusar marriage
was entered into because of the love of these two
people and not because the second Mrs. Kusar thought
that she was acquiring the fruits of the work and love
of an earlier marriage. And to now say that the
distribution of these fruits to the products of the
first marriage (i.e. the children, would be against
public policy) would seem to us to be against public
policy, as well as unjust and inequitable."
In Perlberg vs. Perlberg, supra, at 308, the court stated:
"There is nothing inherently unlawful or sinister in
transferring real property to one's children. On the
contrary, such an act may be said to be of high moral
and social merit. An engagement to marry cannot
operate to impress a duty of disclosure to a prospective spouse as a condition to the lawful transfer
of real property."
Furthermore, in the Perlberg case, at page 307, the court
stipulated:
"...the deed in this particular case was recorded, and the
purpose of recording an instrument is to give*notice, and
'•-...it is notice to the world, and this would include
notice to the prospective bride."

13.
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We agree with the trial Judge that the filing of the deed,
even on the day before marriage, constitutes legal notice of the
conveyance. The deeds from Dr. Jones to First Security Bank were
executed and delivered to First Security Bank several months prior
to the marriage of Dr. and Mrs. Jones.
In Wilson vs. Lowerie (1925) 77 Golo. 427, 236 P. 1004,
the trial court found that:
"Such transfers were genuine and actual, and therefore
valid even though they were made to deprive the
decedent's widow of her inheritance, and in affirming
such ruling, the court on appeal, rejected the argument
that it was error for the trial court to exclude
evidence to the effect that the widow had no knowledge
of such transfers, that she never consented to them,
and that the property transferred belonged to the widow
at the time of her marriage to the decedent and the
decedent had obtained it from her. The widow's
knowledge of the transfers, said the court, was
immaterial and her consent thereto was irrelevant,
since the transfers were valid without either.
Moreover, observed the court, if the property belonged
to the decedent, it was unimportant how the decedent
got it, and if it belonged to the widow, the instant
administrator had no interest in it and could not assign
as prejudicial error the rejection of evidence that
would defeat him/1
In Lundstrom vs. Radio Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114,
405 P. 2d 339, 341 (1965), this court has said:
"Firs':? fraud is a wrong of such nature that it must
be shown by clear and convincing proof and will not
lie in mere suspicion or innuendo."
The Ohio court, in Perlberg, supra, 308, stated:
"If. evidence is adduced in the requisite quantum that
a beticothed woman has been the victim of actual fraud,
her cause of action to set aside such fraudulent
conveyance will lie* The record contains no such
evidence."
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It is Appellees1 claim that Mrs. Jones knew about the
trust prior to the death of Dr. Jones;
ence of his family;
them;

that she knew of the depend-

that she knew of his desire to provide for

that she would have married him even if she had originally

known about the trust;

that the $20,000.00 trust and other benefits

adequately provided for her sustenance;

and, therefore, there was no

fraud upon her marital rights and she has suffered no damages.
CONCLUSION
The interest possessed by Dr. Clarence T. Jones following
the establishment of the trust on June 23, 1961, and the execution
and delivery of a deed to real property on July 14, 1961, was not
a legal or equitable estate in real property possessed by the
husband at any time during the marriage within the meaning of
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Further, the facts of
this case are such that the transfer of said real property was not
illusory nor in fraud of his prospective wife's interests.

Respectfully submitted,
HEBER GRANT IVINS
Attorney for Respondents
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah

84003
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